UIC Law Review
Volume 11

Issue 2

Article 8

Winter 1978

People Ex. Rel. Scott v. Briceland: Powers of the Attorney General
Revisited, 11 J. Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 441 (1978)
Thomas E. Grace

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas E. Grace, People Ex. Rel. Scott v. Briceland: Powers of the Attorney General Revisited, 11 J.
Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 441 (1978)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss2/8
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

CASENOTE
PEOPLE EX REL. SCOTT v. BRICELAND:
POWERS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL REVISITED
Both the 1870 Illinois Constitution and the 1970 Illinois Constitution provided, in similar language, for an Attorney General,'
and fixed his powers and/or duties as those that "may be prescribed by law."' 2 The first case extensively to discuss those
duties "prescribed by law" under the 1870 constitution was Fergus v. Russel,8 where the Illinois Supreme Court said that the
Attorney General had all of the powers of his English predecessor
at common law. 4 The court concluded that the Attorney General
was the law officer of the state and its sole representative in
the courts in any action in which the state was the real party
in interest.5 This interpretation is in sharp contrast to decisions
of other states having similar or identical constitutional provisions regarding the powers and/or duties of the Attorney General. 6 With the comprehensive revision of the 1870 constitution
1. ILL. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1870) provides:
The executive department shall consist of a governor, lieutenant
governor, secretary of state, auditor of public accounts, treasurer,
superintendent of public instruction and attorney general, who shall,
each, with the exception of the treasurer, hold his office for the term

of four years from the second Monday of January next after his elec-

tion, and until his successor is elected and qualified. They shall,
except the lieutenant governor, reside at the seat of government during their term of office, and keep the public records, books and
papers there, and shall perform such duties as may be prescribed
by law.
ILL. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1970) provides: "The Executive Branch shall
include a Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary
of State, Comptroller and Treasurer elected by the electors of the State.
They shall keep the public records and maintain a residence at the seat
of government during their term of office."
2. ILL. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1870); see note 1 supra for text of section.
ILL. CONST. art. V, § 15 (1970) provides: "The Attorney General shall
be the legal officer of the State, and shall have the duties and powers
that may be prescribed by law."
3. 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915).
4. Id. at 342, 110 N.E. at 145.
5. Id.; see text accompanying notes 94-95 infra.
6. See People v. Miner, 2 Lans. 396 (N.Y. 1886) (faced with a constitutional provision providing that the duties of the Attorney General
"shall be such as now are or may hereafter be prescribed by law," the
court held that the legislature could withdraw any of his common law
powers); State v. Davidson, 33 N. Mex. 664, 275 P. 373 (1929) (since the
office of Attorney General was of statutory origin, the fact that he was
subsequently made a constitutional officer did not confer upon him the
common law duties of his English counterpart); see also Julian v. State,
122 Ind. 68, 23 N.E. 691 (1890) (Attorney General has only such power as
is delegated to him by statute); Cosson v. Bradshaw, 160 Iowa 296, 141
N.W. 1062 (1913) (Attorney General has only those powers conferred
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by the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, and the subsequent adoption of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, questions were
raised as to the continued vitality of the Fergus decision.
At the time of the adoption of the 1970 constitution, no decision had extended the duties of the Attorney General to prosecution of administrative proceedings.7 Included in the 1970 constitution was a mandate to the General Assembly to enact legislaEven
tion to provide for and maintain a healthful environment.'
though enacted prior to the adoption of the constitution, the Environmental Protection Act 9 was considered to be a fulfillment
of this constitutional mandate. 10 The Environmental Protection
Act created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which
was directed to administer and enforce the Act." The Act specifically directed the EPA to prepare and present all administrative
actions before the Illinois Pollution Control Board. 12 The Attorney General was given enforcement responsibilities, but not at
the administrative level. 13
4
the Illinois Supreme
In People ex rel. Scott v. Briceland,1
Court was confronted with the issue of whether the exclusion
of the Attorney General from the preparation and presentation of
administrative actions before the Pollution Control Board was

upon him by statute); State v. Seattle Gas & Elec. Co., 28 Wash. 488,
495, 68 P. 946, 949 (1902) (merely because the Attorney General was
given the name of his English counterpart did not mean that he was to
have the same powers, the court stating, "[t]here is nothing in a mere
name.")
7. See text accompanying notes 101-07 infra.
8. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1970); see note 35 infra for text of section.
9. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111Y, §§ 1001-1054 (1975).
10. City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Board, 59 Ill. 2d 484, 490,
322 N.E.2d 11, 15 (1974):
Our analysis of the constitutional proceedings compels us to conclude that the provisions of the Environmental Protection Act, and
the rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto, are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution and the clear intention
expressed by the constitutional convention concerning the area of
environmental protection.
11. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111Y2, § 1004(a) (1975) provides:
There is established in the Executive Branch of the State Government an agency to be known as the Environmental Protection
The Director . . . shall employ and direct such perAgency ....
sonnel, and shall provide for such laboratory and other facilities, as
may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act....
12. Id. at § 1004(e); see note 24 infra for text of section. See also
Immel, Pollution Control in Illinois-The Role of the Attorney General,
23 DE PAUL L. Ruv. 961, 965 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Immel] ("it is
the function of the [EPA] to initiate enforcement actions"); Klein, Pollution Control in Illinois, The Formative Years, 22 DE PAUL L. REv. 759
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Klein] (claiming that the EPA is directed
to prosecute enforcement proceedings to the exclusion of the Attorney
General under the Act); text accompanying note 32 infra.
13. See notes 30-31 and accompanying text infra; see also Immel,
supra note 12, at 972-73 (outlining the powers of the Attorney General
under the Act).
14. 65 Ill. 2d 485, 359 N.E.2d 149 (1976).
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an unconstitutional usurpation of the Attorney General's powers.
The Attorney General contended that he was empowered to prosecute these actions under the constitution as interpreted by Fergus. Conversely, the EPA contended that it was directed by statute to prosecute these actions. By holding that the Attorney
General was the only state official authorized to represent the
state in administrative proceedings before the Pollution Control
Board,"' the court established that this broadened interpretation
of Fergus was incorporated into, and became the essence of, section 15 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.16 The decision in
Briceland effectively quells any and all historical arguments that
might successfully challenge the extent of power held by the Attorney General, giving him an impregnable claim to powers that
he should not have.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In May of 1976, defendants Briceland and Diver, as Director
and Deputy Director, respectively, of the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency, filed five separate enforcement actions before
the Illinois Pollution Control Board without the authorization
of the Illinois Attorney General. Prior to this, a political agreement had been forged between the Governor and the Attorney
General. Under this agreement, all proposed enforcement. actions were to be sent to the Attorney General, who had the option
to prosecute the actions.' 7 If he chose not to prosecute, the EPA
was allowed to litigate with its own attorneys.' 8 Upon learning
of the unauthorized filing of the enforcement actions, the Attorney General advised the defendants that they had no legal, right
to litigate the actions.
When the EPA refused to halt the litigation, the Attorney
General brought suit seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that he
was the only state officer who could present enforcement actions
before the Pollution Control Board; (2) an injunction restraining
15. Id. at 500, 359 N.E.2d at 157.
16.

Id.

17. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 9-14, People ex rel. Scott v.

Briceland. 65 Ill. 2d 485, 359 N.E.2d 149 (1976) (outlining the agreement
made in February, 1971, between former Governor Ogilvie and Attorney

General Scott, empowering the Attorney General to represent the'.EPA

in those actions which the Attorney General chose and otherwise allowing the EPA to use its own attorneys); see, e.g., Klein, supra note 12,
at 772 (showing the effects on the EPA of the Attorney General's'demand
to represent the EPA).
18. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 9-14, People ex rel. Scott v.
Briceland, 65 Ill. 2d 485, 359 N.E.2d 149 (1976). But see Immel, supra
note 12, at 968-69 (claiming that the Attorney General has never declined to prosecute cases because he differed with the Director's policy

decisions).
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the EPA from prosecuting actions before the Pollution Control
Board; and later, (3) an order holding defendants Briceland and
Diver personally liable for all funds expended by the EPA in
prosecuting actions before the Pollution Control Board. Defendants counterclaimed for a declaration that they were entitled to
representation by counsel other than the Attorney General in
the instant -action. Both parties moved for summary judgment,
with the individual defendants also moving to dismiss the personal liability count.
From the summary judgment of the Circuit Court of Sangamon County,19 a direct appeal was taken to the Illinois Supreme
Court. 20 Both parties appealed from portions of the circuit court
decision. 21 The supreme court, speaking through Justice Ryan,
unanimously affirmed the decision of the circuit court in all respects.
SUPREME COURT OPINION

Environmental ProtectionAct
The Illinois Supreme Court initially was confronted with the
issue of whether the Environmental Protection Act 22 directed the
EPA to prosecute actions before the Pollution Control Board.
This examination was undertaken to comply with the canon of
statutory construction which dictates that a court will not pass
upon a constitutional dispute when the case may be disposed of
on other grounds. 23 Since the EPA was basing its right to litigate on section 4(e) of the Act 2 4 which directed the EPA to "pre19. Memorandum order of July 13, 1976, and judgment order of July
20, 1976, People ex tel. Scott v. Briceland, No. 276-76, Judge Verticchio
(granting Attorney General's motion for summary judgment, entering
permanent injunction, dismissing defendant director and deputy director
in their individual capacities, and entering judgment declaring that defendants were entitled to legal representation by counsel other than the
Attorney General).
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 302(a) (1975) provides: "Appeals
from final judgments of circuit courts shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court (1) in cases in which a statute of the United States or of
this State has been held invalid, and (2) in proceedings to review orders
of the Industrial Commission."
21. Defendants appealed from the issuance of the injunction and the
finding of the circuit court that section 4(e) of the Environmental Protection Act was unconstitutional.

Plaintiff appealed from the dismissal

of the defendants in their individual capacity and the declaration that
the defendants were entitled to counsel other than the Attorney General
in the present action.
22. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 111%, §§ 1001-1054 (1975).
23. See, e.g., Commissioners of Drainage Dist. No. 5 v. Arnold, 383
Ill. 498, 507, 50 N.E.2d 825, 829 (1943).
24. ILL. REv.STAT. ch. 1112, § 1004(e) (1975) provides:

The Agency shall have the duty to investigate violations of this
Act or of regulations adopted thereunder, or of permits or terms or
conditions thereof, to prepare and present enforcement cases before
the Board, and to take such summary enforcement action as is pro-
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pare and present" enforcement proceedings before the Pollution
Control Board, the court embarked upon an examination of that
section to determine whether it could be interpreted in such a
way as to avoid the constitutional issue.
The court first looked at the definition given the phrase "prepare and present" by the circuit court. The circuit court had
found that to "prepare and present" meant to "fully prosecute
a grievance through all stages, including the taking of evidence,
the making of arguments and all things necessary to its full
understanding. ' 2 5 The supreme court agreed with this definition,2 6 but failed to notice that the authority relied upon by the
circuit court neither defined "prepare and present" nor was an2 7
alogous with the present dispute.
The court attempted to buttress its interpretation by reading
section 4(e) in conjunction with other sections of the Act. After
examining sections 31(a) and (c),28 the court decided that the
Act placed the responsibility of instituting and proving violations
of the Act at the administrative level upon the EPA. 29 The court
then examined the sections of the Act delineating the role of
the Attorney General, 0 and determined that his enforcement revided for by Section 34 of this Act. (emphasis added).
25. Memorandum order of July 13, 1976, at 3, People ex rel. Scott v.
Briceland, No. 276-76, Judge Verticchio.
26. 65 Ill. 2d 485, 491, 359 N.E.2d 149 152 (1976).
27. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1945) (involv-

ing an interpretation of section 9 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act,

29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a) (1973), which provides in part: "Provided, That
any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right
at any time to present grievances to their employer." The Board found
that a "presentation of [a grievance] would include the taking of evidence, the making of argument, and all things necessary to its full understanding.")
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, §§ 1031(a) and (c) (1975) provide in

pertinent part:
(a) If such investigation discloses that a violation may exist,
the Agency shall issue and serve upon the person complained against
a written notice, together with a formal complaint....
(c) In hearings before the Board under this Title the burden
shall be on the Agency or other complainant to show either that the
respondent has caused or threatened to cause air or water pollution
or that the respondent has violated or threatens to violate any provision of this Act or any rule or regulation of the Board or permit
or term or condition thereof.
See also Currie, Enforcement Under the Illinois Pollution Law, 70 Nw.
U.L. REv. 389, 449-54 (1975) (examining prosecution under the Environ-

mental Protection Act).
29. 65 Ill. 2d 485, 491, 359 N.E.2d 149, 152 (1976).
30. Id. at 491-92, 359 N.E.2d at 152:
Section 42 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 1112, par. 1042) provides for the

imposition of civil penalties for violation of the Act which are to

be recovered in actions brought by the Attorney General or the
State's Attorney of the county in which the violation occurred.
Similarly, section 43 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 111 , par. 1043) allows
the Attorney General to institute actions for injunctive relief in
certain cases, and section 44 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 111 , par.
1044) directs that the Attorney General, or the local State's Attorney,
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sponsibilities encompassed only actions before the courts, not at
the administrative level."' The court concluded that section 4(e)
directed the EPA to institute and prosecute enforcement proceedings before the Pollution Control Board. 32 Since the activity of
the defendants was found to be within the statute, the court was
forced to test the constitutionality of the statute.
ConstitutionalStatute Exception

One of the grounds urged by the EPA for upholding the constitutionality of the statute was that section 4 (e) fit within one
of the two exceptions to the exclusive powers of the Attorney
General. These exceptions were first promulgated in Fergus v.
Russel,3" where the supreme court held that the Attorney General's constitutional powers could be diminished "where the Constitution or a constitutional statute may provide."' 4 The EPA
contended that section 4(e) fit within the "constitutional statute"
exception, as it had been enacted in contemplation of article
XI, section 1 of the 1970 constitution.-5
The only prior case to address the "constitutional statute"
exception to which Fergus referred was Stein v. Howlett,' 6 which
involved an attempt to delegate to the Secretary of State power
to render advisory opinions interpreting the Illinois Governmental Ethics Act.' 7 The argument was made that the statute
granting the power to render advisory opinions had been enacted
pursuant to the constitutional provision enumerating the powers
of the Secretary of State,' 8 and was therefore such a "constitushall enforce the criminal penalties of the Act. The Attorney General is also given the sole authority to bring actions for mandamus,
injunction or other appropriate relief against public bodies under
the terms of section 46. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 111 , par. 1046(a).
31. Id. at 492, 359 N.E.2d at 152.
32. Id.
33. 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915).

34. Id. at 342, 110 N.E. at 145.
35. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1970) provides: "The public policy of
the State and the duty of each person is to provide and maintain a
healthful environment for the benefit of this and future generations. The
General Assembly shall provide by law for the implementation and enforcement of this public policy." (emphasis added). See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.

36. 52 Ill. 2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972).
37. ILL. RIv. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-106 (1971) provides in pertinent
part:
Upon the request of any person subject to this Act, the Secretary
of State shall render an advisory opinion in writing, certified by him,
on questions concerning the interpretation of Article 4A of this Act.
The Secretary of State may employ such employees, consultants, and
legal counsel as he considers necessary to carry out his duties hereunder, and may prescribe their duties, fix their compensation, and
provide for reimbursement of their expenses.
38. ILL. CONST. art. V, § 16 (1970):
The Secretary of State shall maintain the official records of the
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tional statute" as would invoke the exception to the powers of
the Attorney General. But the Stein court held the provision
unconstitutional, reasoning that the constitutional language of
the Secretary of State provision was not "broad enough to overturn the provisions of section 15 and the time-honored decisions
pertaining to the duties of the Attorney General. '3 9 The court
did not disclose what criteria were necessary to establish a "constitutional statute" that would fit within the exception.
The Briceland court followed its brief examination of Stein
with a cursory consideration of the language of article XI. 4° The
court stated that the article was "too general to overcome the
constitutional authority of the Attorney General,"4 1 but not
"broad enough to permit the legislature to diminish the Attorney
General's power to represent the State in proceedings designed
to enforce that policy. '42 Therefore, the court concluded, section
4(e) was not such a "constitutional statute" as would fit within
43
the exception established in Fergus.
The court's reasons for refusing to find that section 4 (e) was
a "constitutional statute" are both contradictory and vague. The
court states that article XI is "too general" but not "broad
enough"; 44
yet an examination of the definitions of "broad" and
"general" shows that for something to be too general but not
broad enough is contradictory. Such phrases illustrate that the
court was employing generalities to obscure the fact that it had
no guidelines or criteria to follow in determining whether a statute fit within the "constitutional statute" exception. The court
refused to establish guidelines or criteria in this case.
The implication of the court's statement is that a constitutional article must explicitly state that it is authorizing the legisacts of the General Assembly and such official records of the Executive Branch as provided by law. Such official records shall be available for inspection by the public. He shall keep the Great Seal of
the State of Illinois and perform other duties that may be prescribed
by law.

(emphasis added).

39. 52 Ill. 2d 570, 586-87, 289 N.E.2d 409, 418 (1972).

See generally

Scott, The Role of the Attorney General's Opinions in Illinois, 67 Nw.

U.L. REV. 643 (1972) (involving an examination of the origin of the Attorney General's opinion power, the weight to which those opinions are
entitled, and the procedures involved in drafting and issuing advisory
opinions).
40. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1970); see note 35 supra for text of section.
41. 65 Ill. 2d 485, 501, 359 N.E.2d 149, 157 (1976).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Compare WEsTER's Timin NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

280

(unabr. ed. 1961) (defining "broad" as "widely applicable: not limited
or restricted: general") with id. at 944 (defining "general" as "marked
by broad overall character without being limited, modified, or checked
by narrow, precise considerations: concerned with main elements, major

matters rather than limited details").
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lature to diminish the powers of the Attorney General. Such
a proposition is contrary to the long-established canon of statutory and constitutional construction which dictates that because
constitutions are written in general language, they are to be construed liberally so that they may endure indefinitely; however,
statutes are to be written specifically and construed strictly, as
they are easily amended and their longevity is not paramount.4 5
The decision in Briceland violates this canon. If a specific constitutional provision were required to diminish the Attorney
General's power, that provision would be a "constitution" exception, as opposed to a "constitutional statute" exception. Such
a requirement would make it impossible to create a "constitutional statute" exception. Since Fergus created two exceptions
allowing diminution of the powers of the Attorney General,
a rational interpretation demands that these two exceptions have
46
exclusive and distinct criteria.
Since no Illinois court has defined a "constitutional statute,"
an examination of the individual words is necessary to formulate
a definition. 4 7 When read in conjunction, the words imply that
a "constitutional statute" is an act of the legislature consistent
with the constitution. It can be argued that the Environmental
Protection Act 48 was the legislature's answer to the constitutional mandate of article XI. 4 9 As such, section 4(e) would be
a statute consistent with the constitution, and therefore a "constitutional statute."
A plausible argument can also be made that article XI was
intended to be a limitation on the Attorney General's powers.
The Attorney General provision and article XI were enacted
simultaneously in the 1970 constitution. Logically, they should
be given equal weight and effect. That the interpretation of Fer45. E.g., Peabody v. Russel, 301 Ill. 439, 134 N.E. 148 (1922) (courts
should not construe a constitutional provision so strictly as to exclude
its real object and intent). See generally Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d
78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955) (a constitutional guaranty should be interpreted in a broad and liberal spirit, and if there is any distinction between rules governing construction of constitutions and rules that apply
to statutes, less technical ones are applied in construing constitutions).
46. Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 342, 110 N.E. 130, 145 (1915); see
People v. Vraniak, 5 Ill. 2d 384, 125 N.E.2d 513 (1955) (use of "[t]he word
'or' marks an alternative indicating that the various members of the sen-

tence which it connects are to be taken separately.")
47. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIoNARY 385 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (defining

"constitutional" as "[c] onsistent with the constitution; authorized by the
constitution. Dependent upon a constitution, or secured or regulated by
a constitution"); id. at 1581 (defining "statute" as "[a]n act of the legislature declaring, commanding or prohibiting something; a particular law
enacted and established by the will of the legislative department of government").
48. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111Y2, §§ 1001-1054 (1975).
49. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1970). See note 35 supra for text of
section.
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gus had not, at the time of the adoption of the 1970 constitution,
been expanded to include administrative actions5 ° gives credence
to this argument. Under this interpretation, article XI would
allow the legislature to fulfill its mandate by creating an administrative agency empowered under section 4 (e) to prosecute its
own administrative proceedings.
History of the Attorney General
The Attorney General claimed that section 4(e) was unconstitutional because he was the only state officer empowered by
the constitution to prosecute actions before the Pollution Control
Board. His claim rested upon the delineation of his constitutional powers in Fergus v. Russel,51 and he argued that Fergus
had been incorporated into the 1970 constitution. The court responded by comparing the provisions of the 1870 and 1970 constitutions regarding the powers of the Attorney General, 52 and
then briefly reviewed the history of the Attorney General and
his powers.
After reviewing the facts of Fergus, the court in Briceland
found that Fergus had interpreted the 1870 constitution as granting to the Attorney General all the powers associated with that
office at common law, and had held that while the legislature
might add to these powers, it could not reduce them.53 Briceland
interpreted Fergus to mean that "the Attorney General is the
sole officer who may conduct litigation in which the People of
the State are the real party in interest. 15 4 The court conceded
that Fergus had been subject to criticism, 55 but noted that it had
50. See text accompanying notes 101-07 infra.
51. 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915).
52. Compare ILL. CONST. art. V, § 15 (1970) ("The Attorney General
shall be the legal officer of the State, and shall have the duties and
powers that may be prescribed by law.") with ILL. CONST. art. V, § 1
(1870) (see note 1 supra for text of section).
53. 65 Ill. 2d at 493, 359 N.E.2d at 153. But see text accompanying
notes 86-89 infra (illustrating that Illinois is the only state to give this
interpretation to the constitutional language of the Attorney General pro-

vision).
54. 65 Ill. 2d at 495, 359 N.E.2d at 154. But see notes 114-15 and ac-

companying text infra (dealing with the contention of Fergus that the

Attorney General had the common law duty of being the Crown's sole
representative in the courts); notes 60-68 and accompanying text infra
(illustrating that the common law history of the Attorney General establishes that the Attorney General, in 1606, was not the sole representative
of the Crown in the courts; nor did he have the duty to represent administrative agencies).
55. See DeLong, Powers and Duties of the State Attorney-General
in Criminal Prosecution, 25 J. CalM. L. 358, 368 (1935) ("The supreme
court of Illinois appears to stand entirely alone in applying a weird construction to the constitutional provision which is found in so many states
providing that the attorney-general shall have 'such duties as may be
prescribed by law.'"); see also D. BRADEN & R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CON-
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never been overruled.5 6 Rather, it had repeatedly been cited with
approval, 57 and was valid law when the 1970 constitution was
adopted. 5
The court then summarily refused to consider the
EPA's contention that Fergus rested upon an erroneous interpretation of the common law.19 However, the interpretation
in Fergus that the Attorney General had all the powers of
his predecessor at common law is the foundation upon which
the decision in Briceland is built. This necessitates an examination of those common law powers to determine whether the decision in Fergus, and therefore Briceland, was based on an erroneous interpretation of the common law.

Common Law
At early common law, the King was responsible for the protection of the rights and liberties of his subjects and the administration of laws on their behalf. 60 When required to appear in
court, he frequently appointed a special attorney to represent the
public interest, initially on a case-by-case basis. 61 In time, there
sTrruioN: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 253-60 (1969)
("IT]he really strange thing about the case [Fergus] is that the court
used the words 'such duties as may be prescribed by law' to back up
its argument that the 1870 drafters meant to clothe the Attorney General
with the powers of the English common law Attorney General . . . [I]t
would seem appropriate, and, it is hoped, not too controversial, to do
something about the Fergus v. Russel determination concerning the Attorney General.") See generally notes 84-100 and accompanying text
infra.
56. See text accompanying notes 101-13 infra.
57. See, e.g., Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill. 2d 570, 586, 289 N.E.2d 409, 418
(1972) (declaring that the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention
of 1970 indicated a clear intent to preserve the Fergus principle which
reserved to the Attorney General the sole authority to render advisory
opinions); Department of Mental Health v. Coty, 38 Ill. 2d 602, 606, 232
N.E.2d 686, 689 (1967) (indicating that the Attorney General could file
suit under the statute to recover for treatment of mentally retarded patients under his common law powers); People ex rel. Barrett v. Finnegan, 378 Ill. 387, 38 N.E.2d 715 (1941) (involving a mandamus action
brought under the Attorney General's statutory power to compel a circuit
court judge to expunge an order from the record). But see People v.
Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n; 3 Ill. 2d 218, 120 N.E.2d 35 (1954)
(indicating that State commissions would be allowed to retain legal
counsel, with the Attorney General controlling them-a retreat from the
complete centralization of power dictated by Fergus); People ex rel.
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. Barrett, 382 Ill. 321, 46 N.E.2d 951
(1943) (establishing the public corporation exception to Fergus, reasoning that since the Attorney General did not have the duty to represent
public corporations at common law, he did not have the power under
ergus to represent them in the present).
58. 65 ll. 2d at 495, 359 N.E.2d at 154.
59. Id. at 500, 359 N.E.2d at 156.
60. See Comment, The Illinois Attorney General: Exclusive Legal
Counsel for the State?, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 470, 471 (the King was the supreme "Justiciar" in the 13th century, akin to the relationship existing
etween state or federal governments and their citizens) [hereinafter
cited as Illinois Attorney General].
61. Id. See also Holdsworth, The Early History of the Attorney and
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emerged a trend to appoint fewer attorneys with more responsibility, allowing them to appoint deputies.6 2 By the beginning
of the 16th century, this centralization of the Crown's legal talent
resulted in the creation of the offices of the King's Attorney,
6 3
later known as the Attorney General, and the King's Solicitor.
Though considered important officers, neither was the sole ad64
visor of the Crown nor its only representative in the courts.
Eventually, the role of the Attorney General was magnified
until he did become the Crown's sole representative in the
courts.65 While there is some dispute as to when he achieved
this preeminence, 66 the most credible authority points to his having attained this status by the middle of the 17th century. 67 This
date is significant because Illinois does not bind itself to English
decisions after 1606.68 Therefore, while the Attorney General
may have been one of the Crown's representatives in the courts
in 1606, he was not its only representative.
Solicitor General, 13 ILL. L. REv. 602, 612 (1919) (the attorney was also
appointed for a particular court, a particular area, or a particular business) [hereinafter cited as Holdsworth].
62. See Holdsworth, supra note 61, at 606 (indicating that this process had been completed by the end of the 15th century); see also T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 205 (2d ed. 1936).

63. See Holdsworth, supra note 61, at 615 (the Solicitor General was
envisaged as subordinate to the Attorney General, created to perform

the same functions as the private solicitor performed for the private attorney, and thus became a stepping-stone to the position of Attorney
General).
64. Id. (the advisory and representative duties were shared with the
King's Serjeants); see Illinois Attorney General, supra note 60, at 471
(the Attorney General was not the King's only legal advisor at the beginning of the 16th century).

65. See Holdsworth, supra note 61, at 606.

66. Id. at 616 (indicating that Hudson, a noted English historian,
stated that in 1604 the Attorney General was the only representative of
the Crown who could proceed by information in the Court of Star
Chamber, and was therefore the sole representative of the Crown at that
time).

67. Id. at 602:

But the offices of the attorney and solicitor general only began to
assume their modern shape in the course of the sixteenth century;
and it was not till the end of the seventeenth century that they in
substance attained it. By that date they had become legal advisors

of the crown.
Illinois Attorney General, supra note 60, at 472: "Historians observe that

the attorney general used his exclusive power of initiating litigation to
become the King's chief litigator by the middle of the seventeenth century, thus ousting the serjeants from their former position of superiority."
This article also cites Holdsworth and Roger North, English historian and
author, as supporting the proposition that the Attorney General did not
become the Crown's sole representative in the courts until the middle
of the 17th century.
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 28, § 1 (1975) provides in part:
That the common law of England, so far as the same is applicable and of a general nature, and all statutes or acts of the British
parliament made in aid of, and to supply the defects of the common
law, prior to the fourth year of James the First. . . and which are of
a general nature and not local to that kingdom, shall be the rule
of decision, and shall be considered as of full force until repealed
by legislative authority.
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One factnot disputed by historians is that the Attorney General's powers did not extend to the representation of departments
of the CrownA9 The equivalent of the modern agency or depart70
ment was not established in England until the 19th century.
There existed forerunners of the modern department in 1606, but
they retained their own counsel independent of the Attorney
General. 1 These legal representatives were responsible to their
respective departments, not to the Attorney General, and they
transacted their legal affairs without control, supervision, or representation by the office of the Attorney General. 72 This historical fact has been recognized in Illinois cases which have found
that the special statutory proceedings under the Environmental
73
Protection Act were unknown at common law.
The colonial Attorney General's office began as an extension
of the English Attorney General's office.74 After the American
Revolution, each state retained the Attorney General within its
government, giving him many of the same powers held by his
English counterpart. 75 As territories were created, the federal
government appointed an Attorney General for each,7 6 including
Illinois.7 7 Under the 1818' Illinois Constitution, the General Assembly was given the option of creating and appointing an Attor-

69. See

12 W. HOLDSWORTH,

HISTORY

OF

THE ENGLISH

LAw

10-13

(1938) (indicating that the Attorney General was not directly concerned with the departments' prosecution of cases); 1 CHALMERS,
OPINIONS OF EMINENT LAwYERS xi-xii (indicating that the Attorney General's early representation of governmental departments
was the result of government commission rather than common law
duty).
70. See Cooley, Predecessors of the Federal Attorney General: The
Attorney General in England and the American Colonies, 2 AM. J. LEGAL
HIsTORY 304, 307-08 (1958); Illinois Attorney General, supra note 60, at
476 n.46 (government by administrative agency was unknown at common law as the English form of modern bureaucracy, the cabinet, did
not develop until the 19th century).
71. See Illinois Attorney General, supra note 60, at 472-73.
72. Id.

73. Fry Roofing Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 20 Ill. App. 3d 301, 310,

314 N.E.2d 350, 357 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 996 (1975) (petitioner
was claiming right to jury trial in administrative proceedings before Pollution Control Board; the court declared that "[t]he constitutional guarantee of right to trial by jury was never intended to apply to administrative proceedings which were unknown at common law, and therefore,
petitioner cannot argue that this right has been abridged"); Ford v. Environmental Protection Agency, 9 Ill. App. 3d 711, 719, 292 N.E.2d 540,
545 (1973) (commenting on proceedings under the 'Environmental Pro-

tection Act: "We have before us a special statutory proceeding unknown

to the common law ..
")
74. Illinois Attorney General, supra note 60, at 472-73. See generally
H. CUMMINGS & C. McFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTI E 11 (1937); Key, The
Legal Work of the Federal Government, 25 VA. L. REV. 169-73 (1938).
75. See Illinois Attorney General, supra note 60, at 473.

76. Id.

77. Id. See Fairlie & Simpson, Law Officers in Illinois, 8 J. MAR.
L.Q. 65 (1942).
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ney General. 78 In 1819, the General Assembly required the Attorney General to perform such duties "as are or may be defined
by law. ' 79 The 1848 constitution abolished the appointive office

of the Attorney General and failed to establish an elective replacement.8 0 In 1867, the General Assembly created the elective
office of the Attorney General,81 but it was not until the 1870
constitution that the Attorney General was established as an
82
elective constitutional officer.

Fergus v. Russel

The first case" extensively to discuss the duties of the Attors4
ney General under the 1870 constitution was Fergus v. Russel,
a court action by the Attorney General which challenged appropriations to government departments for legal expenses incurred
in prosecuting violations of the law. In finding one of the appropriations unconstitutional, the court examined the Attorney General's duties to determine whether they had been invaded by the
department. The court reasoned that since the constitution conferred no express duties on the Attorney General, he was to have
those duties held by the English Attorney General at common
law. 85 This reasoning is contrary to the decisions of many other
7
states.8 6 Illustrative is State v. Davidson,"
where the New
Mexico court held that since the Attorney General was of statutory origin and his powers and duties were enumerated in the
statute creating the Territory, the fact that he subsequently was
made a constitutional officer did not confer upon him the comILL. CONST. SCHEDULE §

10 (1818): "An auditor of public accounts,

79. 1819 Ill. Laws 204-06.

See also Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304,

78.

an attorney general, and such other officers for the state as may be necessary, may be appointed by the general assembly; whose duties may be
regulated by law."
357, 110 N.E. 130, 150 (1915)

(Craig, J., dissenting).

80. See Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 357, 110 N.E. 130, 150 (1915)
(Craig, J., dissenting).
81. PUBLIc LAWS OF 1867 at 46. For a discussion of the duties given
the Attorney General under this statute see Freels, Powers of the Attorney General of Illinois, 53 CH. B. REc. 119, 121-22 (1971).
82. ILL. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1870). See note 1 supra for text of sec-

tion.

83. One case was decided prior to Fergus v. Russel, but it did not
extensively discuss the powers of the Attorney General. Hunt v. Chicago
Horse & Dummy Ry. Co., 20 Ill. App. 282 (1886), rev'd on other grounds,
121 Ill. 638, 13 N.E. 176 (1887) (holding that the Attorney General could
bring an action to abate a public nuisance because the constitution authorized abatement actions as part of the Attorney General's duties prescribed by common law).

84. 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915).

85. Id. at 342, 110 N.E. at 145 ("By our Constitution we created this

office by the common law designation of Attorney General and thus impressed it with all its common law powers and duties.")
86. See, e.g., cases cited in note 6 supra.
87. 33 N. Mex. 664, 275 P. 373 (1929).
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mon law duties and powers of his English counterpart.8 8 Davidson is analogous to Fergus because the Illinois Attorney General
was a "creature of statute", prior to the 1870 constitution.8 9
Under the rationale of Davidson and the corresponding cases in
other states, the Attorney General should not have the powers
of his common law predecessor.
After determining that the Attorney General did have those
powers, Fergus attempted to define them. The court came to
the conclusion that "at common law the Attorney General was
the law officer of the crown and its chief representative in the
courts." 90 The four English cases cited to support this proposition were decided long after 1606,91 and upon examination it is
evident that not one of them stands for the proposition for which
the court cites it. The holdings vary from determinations that
the Attorney General was the Crown's sole representative in
criminal actions 92 to his being the only legal representative in
the Court of King's Bench. 93 The one common denominator is
that none of the cases stands for the proposition that the Attorney General was the Crown's sole representative in all of the
courts.
On the basis of its research, the court in Fergus decided that
the Attorney General "becomes the law officer of the people, as
represented in the state government, and its only legal representative in the courts, unless by the Constitution itself or by some
constitutional statute he has been divested of some of these
powers and duties. '9 4 As should be evident, the Attorney General should not have been held to have this power. However,
the court concluded its analysis with the following passage:
As the office of the Attorney General is the only office at common law which is thus created by our Constitution the Attorney
General is the chief law officer of the state, and the only officer
empowered to represent the people in any suit or proceeding in
which the state is the real party in interest, except where the
Constitution or a constitutional statute may provide otherwise.
With this exception, only, he is the sole official advisor of the
88. Id. at 667, 275 P. at 375.
89. See text accompanying notes 78-82 supra.
90. 270 Ill. 304, 336, 110 N.E. 130. 143 (1915).
91. King v. Austen, 147 Eng. Ren. 48 (Ex. 1821); Attorney General
v. Brown, 36 Eng. Rep. 384 (Ch. 1818); Rex v. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. 327
(K.B. 1770); Wilkes v. Rex, 2 Eng. Rep. 244 (H.L. 1769).
92. Attorney General v. Brown held that criminal prosecutions, with
few exceptions, were within the control of the Attorney General; Wilkes
v. Rex held that the Attorney General was the only officer of the Crown
to present a criminal indictment; Rex v. Wilkes stood for the same proposition as Wilkes v. Rex.
93. An editor's footnote accompanying Attorney General v. Brown attributes to the Attorney General the status of being the only legal representative of the crown recognized before the Court of King's Bench.
94. 270 Ill. 304, 337, 110 N.E. 130, 143 (1915) (emphasis added).
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executive officers, and of all boards, commissions, and departments of the state government, and it is his duty to conduct the
law business of the state, both in and out of the courts.95
When Fergus spoke of the Attorney General's representation
in suits or proceedings, the court must have been using the term
"proceeding" to describe actions in the courts, as administrative
proceedings were neither involved nor discussed in Fergus. The
term "proceeding" was first used in describing insurance actions,
which were prosecuted in the courts, and was intended to explain
the earlier quote that the Attorney General was the "chief representative . . . in the courts."96 To give the words any other
meaning would extend them beyond what was intended and well
beyond the facts of the case.
In stating that the Attorney General was to conduct the law
business "both in and out of the courts,197 the most logical interpretation would equate law business in the courts with court
actions, and law business out of the courts with the rendering
of offical advisory opinions. To contend that the court meant
to include administrative proceedings within the out-of-court
category would extend the decision well beyond the facts confronted by the court, giving an unintended meaning to the words.
In his dissent in Fergus, Justice Craig declared that the Attorney General was not the Crown's sole representative in the
common law courts.9 8 He disagreed with the majority statement
that creation of the post with the common law name "Attorney
General" meant that the voters intended to clothe him with all
of his common law powers and duties.9 9 Since the legislature
had the right to create the office, he argued, the office was wholly
within the control of the legislature, and the legislature could
diminish the Attorney General's powers and duties by statute. 0 0
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 342, 110 N.E. at 145.
Id. at 337, 110 N.E. at 143.
Id. at 342, 110 N.E. at 145.
Id. at 356, 110 N.E. at 150 (Craig, J., dissenting):
To hold that it is the duty of the Attorney General to conduct
the entire law business of the State, and that he is the sole official
adviser of all boards, commissions and departments of State government, in my opinion is unwarranted, and such holding is not supported by the common law authorities. .
99. Id. at 357, 110 N.E. at 150:
It is reasonable to suppose that, in adopting the constitution of 1870
the people had in mind by the term 'Attorney General' the officer
that was known to the law of the State before that time and not
the office existing in England centuries before that time, whose
duties and powers could only be ascertained by an examination of
the early English Reports, if at all.
See, e g text accompanying notes 86-89 supra.
100. Id. at 359, 110 N.E. at 150:
We have held repeatedly that, when an office which the Legislature
has the right to create has been created by statute, such office is
wholly within the control of the Legislature creating it ....

And
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Decisions Subsequent to Fergus
Cases subsequent to Fergus have eroded its conception of the
Attorney General's powers and duties. An exception to Fergus
was clearly created in People ex rel. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. Barrett,'0 ' where the supreme court recognized that the Attorney General did not have the duty to represent public corporations at common law. The court held, therefore, that he did not have the power or duty to represent them
under the Illinois constitution. 10 2 By excluding a group of public
officers from Fergus, the case intimated that officers and agencies
unknown at common law would fare similarly.1 8 Under this rationale, administrative agencies would be excluded from Fergus,
10 4
because they were unknown at common law.
Fergus was eroded further in People v. Illinois State Toll
Highway Commission,10 5 where the supreme court upheld a stateute allowing the Toll Highway Commission to hire its own attorneys. The court reasoned that the Act gave sufficient recognition
to the Attorney General's position as the attorney and legal adviser of the commission because the assistant attorneys or special
prosecutors, though hired by the commission, were subordinate
to him and served at his pleasure. 06 Toll Highway suggested
a slight deviation from the trend toward complete centralization
107
of the state's legal talent.
The first decision concerning the scope of the Attorney General's powers subsequent to the adoption of the 1970 constitution
was Stein v. Howlett, 08 which involved legislation authorizing
the Secretary of State to render advisory opinions interpreting
the Illnois Governmental Ethics Act. 10 9 In striking down this
delegation of power, the supreme court held that Fergus reserved
to the Attorney General power to render advisory opinions, and
cited the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention as indicating an intent to preserve this policy.",
The supreme court reaffirmed the public corporation excepit necessarily follows that the Legislature has the full power to prescribe the duties pertaining to that office and declare what officers
shall manage its affairs and what appropriations are necessary therefore.

101. 382 Ill. 321, 46 N.E.2d 951 (1943).
102. Id. at 346-47, 46 N.E.2d at 964.
103. See Illinois Attorney General, supra note 60, at 476.
104. See text accompanying notes 69-73 supra.
105. 3 Ill. 2d 218, 120 N.E.2d 35 (1954).
106. Id. at 237-38, 120 N.E.2d at 46.
107. See Illinois Attorney General,supra note 60, at 476.
108. 52 Ill. 2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972). See text accompanying
notes 36-39 supra (discussion of Stein on other grounds).
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 601-101 to 608-101 (1975).
110. 52 Ill. 2d 570, 586, 289 N.E.2d 409, 418 (1972).
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tion under the 1970 constitution in Board of Education v. Bakalis. 111 This action involved legislation authorizing the Superintendent of Public Instruction to render official advisory opiriions
interpreting the School Code. 112 In upholding this provision, the
court indicated that the opinions sent to local school boards were
within the public corporation exception created in Trustees of
18
University of Illinois.
Briceland was faced with this historical panorama when it
attempted to ascertain the powers of the Attorney General. By
its analysis and interpretation of Fergus, Briceland expanded
Fergus' holding beyond that which it had covered. Fergus, a
case involving only court actions, held that the Attorney General
was "the only officer empowered to represent the people in any
suit or proceeding in which the state is the real party in interest," ' 4 arguably intending only to cover court actions. Briceland
expanded the statement to include "litigation in which the People
of the State are the real party in interest." 1 5 Although Fergus
had not covered administrative actions, Briceland interpreted it
to include them. The court refused to place administrative
agencies within the public corporation exception created in
Trustees of University of Illinois and upheld in Board of Education v. Bakalis, even though the same analogy applied. After
thus extending Fergus, Briceland turned to the contention that
Fergus was incorporated into the Attorney General provision of
the 1970 constitution.On tN s issue, the court in Briceland based its decision on
three factors. First, the court stated that in construing a constitutional provision, an important object of inquiry is the understanding of the voters who adopted the document. 1 6 After examining the official explanation that accompanied the proposed
1970 constitution distributed to the voters,' 17 Briceland decided
that there was no indication of departure from prior decisions
defining the Attorney General's duties.'1 8 The second factor considered was that the Constitutional Convention was provided
111. 54 Ill. 2d 448, 299 N.E.2d 737 (1973).
112. I... REv. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 1-1 to 36-1 (1975).

113. 54 Ill. 2d 448, 470-71, 299 N.E.2d 737, 748 (1973).
114. 270 Ill. 304, 342, 110 N.E. 130, 145 (1915) (emphasis added).
115. 65 Ill. 2d 485, 495, 359 N.E.2d 149, 154 (1976).
116. Id. at 496, 359 N.E.2d at 154; see, e.g., Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 Ill. 2d 453, 467, 359 N.E.2d 138, 144-45
(1976); Board of Educ. v. Bakalis, 54 Ill. 2d 448, 476-77, 299 N.E.2d 737,
751-52 (1973) (concurring opinion); Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d 77, 88,

126 N.E.2d 701, 707 (1955).
117. 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION at 2711 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as PROcEEDINGS]: "This
section means that the Attorney General is the legal officer of the State.
It makes no change in his current position."

118. 65 Ill. 2d 485, 496, 359 N.E.2d 149, 154 (1976).
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with a means to abrogate Fergus in the 1970 constitution, 1 9 but
the convention failed to use the means. 120 The final factor concerned the debates of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention regarding the Attorney General article. 12 The court decided that the debates indicated that Fergus was to have contin122
ued vitality under the 1970 constitution.
Briceland stated that its analysis of the three factors led to
the conclusion that Fergus v. Russel' 23 was incorporated into,
and became the essence of, article V, section 15 of the 1970 constitution.' 24 Even though Fergus inaccurately interpreted the
powers and duties of the Attorney General and gave him powers
and duties he did not have, those powers were entrenched in the
1970 constitution.
In light of the constitutional proceedings, Briceland held that
the Attorney General is the sole officer authorized to represent
the People of Illinois in any litigation in which the State is the
real party in interest, absent a contrary constitutional directive.125 This is not what the 1970 constitution provided. It was intended to maintain Fergus as it was, not to expand or contract
it. 12 6 Fergus held that the Attorney General was the sole repre119. D.

BRADEN

& R. COHN,

THE ILLINois CoNsTITUTIoN:

NOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

260 (1969):

AN AN-

[I]t would seem appropriate, and, it is hoped, not too controversial,
to do something about the Fergus v. Russel determination concerning the Attorney General. There is a simple drafting change that
will introduce adequate flexibility in allocating legal work within
the Executive Department. The change is to use the words of the
1818 Schedule-"whose duties may be regulated by law"-in place
of "perform such duties as may be prescribed by law."
120. 65 Ill. 2d 485, 496-97, 359 N.E.2d 149, 155 (1976).
121. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 117, at 1312-15. See generally Lousin,
Constitutional Intent: The Illinois Supreme Court's Use of the Record
in Interpreting the 1970 Constitution, 8 J. MAR. J. 189 (1974).
122. 65 Ill. 2d 485, 499, 359 N.E.2d 149, 156 (1976).
123. 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915).
124. 65 Ill. 2d 485, 500, 359 N.E.2d 149, 156 (1976).
125. Id.
126. 3 PROCEEDINGS,supra note 117, at 1312-13 (1969):
MR. YOUNG: Now, we do not intend by this section to either
reduce or expand the powers of the attorney general, but to simply
keep them as they are at the present time ....
However, the attorney. general is the legal officer for the state, and under our article
we hope to keep it just exactly as it is.
Id. at 1313:
, MR. YOUNG: Our wording in this section is simply to maintain
the status quo and whatever the Fergus v. Russel means is to be applied to this section.
Id. at 1314:
MR. TOMEI: I take it that the committee is willing at this point.
to leave the law wherever it is in terms of whether the Fergus holding is--r the dicta rather-is dicta or holding or just what it's [sic]
significance is. But the committee's intention is to leave that problem-vague or ambiguous as it might be-where it is now?
MR. YOUNG: That is correct. We have no intention to change
it....

We are not attempting to broaden or narrow.

All we want
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sentative in the courts;127 any arguably broader statements in
the case were mere dicta. Briceland refused to limit Fergus to
prosecution of court cases, citing two legal articles 128 as its only
support for its extension of Fergus.
The court concluded that the Attorney General is the sole
officer entitled to represent the interests of the state in litigation before the Pollution Control Board.1 29 Therefore, section
4(e) of the Environmental Protection Act was unconstitutional, but only to the extent that it authorized the institution
and prosecution of administrative proceedings before the Pollution Control Board by any state officer other than the Attorney
General. 130
At the same time as the decision in Briceland, the supreme
court decided Fuchs v. Bidwill,l 3' a taxpayer suit seeking to
create a constructive public trust over money illegally gained by
certain state legislators. The court decided that the Attorney
General was the only person, whether state officer or private
individual, who could bring such an action, thus denying taxpayers access to the courts.'1 2 The court's stated reason was the
desire to avoid a multiplicity of suits.

83

Fuchs avoided the im-

portant decision-the legality of the conduct and the retention
of illegal profits-by conferring upon the Attorney General the
exclusive right to bring these actions, a right he neither claimed
84
nor wanted.
The most recent case to deal with the powers of the Attorney
General is Environmental ProtectionAgency v. Pollution Control

Board,13 5 in which the Illinois Supreme Court was faced with
to do is leave it as is; and if the courts change the Fergus v. Russel,

why they can change it.
See also id. at 1312-13.
127. 270 fll. 304, 337, 110 N.E. 130, 145 (1915); see notes 94-97 and
accompanying text supra.
128. See Cohn, Attorney General and Governor Fight over Control
of Lawyers Employed by Executive Agencies, 1 ILL. ISSUES 9 (1975)
("There can be little quarrel with his claim of right to 'appear as an advocate before administrative tribunals, as well as in court. "); Illinois Attorney General, supra note 60, at 477-78 ("House counsel would also be
restricted by the Attorney General's power to control litigation and to
prosecute statutory violations. Although house counsel could investigate
violations and draft proposed complaints, they would have to turn actual
prosecutions over to the attorney general's office.")
129. 65 Ill. 2d 485, 501-02, 359 N.E.2d 149, 157 (1976).

130. Id.
131. 65 Ill. 2d 503, 359 N.E.2d 158 (1976).
132. Id. at 510, 359 N.E.2d at 162.

133. Id.
134. Id. at 511, 359 N.E.2d at 162 (Schaefer, J., dissenting).

135. 69 Ill. 2d 394, 372 N.E.2d 50 (1977). See McGreevey, The Illinois
Attorney General's Representation of Opposing State Agencies-Conflicts
of Interest, Policy and Practice, 66 Ia.

B.J. 308 (1978)

(explores the

cases leading up to the EPA case, examines the decision and its rationale,
and makes predictions as to its possible effect on the powers of the Attorney General).
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the inevitable result of its decision in Briceland. In this case, the
Illinois Pollution Control Board sought representation by private
counsel in the appellate court in all cases in which the EPA
appealed from Board orders, because of a potential conflict of
interest. 136 The court held that the Attorney General could
represent competing state agencies, as he has the duty of "serving
or representing the broader interests of the State. ' 137 The
court's rationale for this further expansion of the powers of the
Attorney General was that the Attorney General-State agency
relationship is not akin to the traditional role of private counsel38
client.
PersonalLiability and Right to Independent Counsel
Briceland also considered the issue of defendants Briceland
and Diver's personal liability for litigation costs expended by the
EPA in prosecutions before the Pollution Control Board. Before
disposing of the issue, the court reiterated the well-established
rule that a public officer is immune from individual liability for
the performance of discretionary duties undertaken in good
faith.' 39 Briceland reasoned that the action taken by the defendants in instituting enforcement actions was pursuant to a statute requiring the EPA to prosecute enforcement actions at the
administrative level. As such, though in opposition to the
Attorney General's advice, their action was a good faith exercise
140
of discretion for which they would not be held liable.
The final issue of the case involved a determination of
whether the EPA was entitled to counsel other than the Attorney
General in the present action. The court held that since the Attorney General filed suit against the EPA, he was "interested"
in the cause which it was his duty to defend; hence the situation
fit within the statutory provision that allows the court to appoint
special counsel in place of the Attorney General. 14 1 The court
therefore affirmed the decision of the trial court on this point.
136. 69 Ill. 2d at 397, 372 N.E.2d at 50. See McGreevey, supra note 135,
at 310 (outlines the procedures in the lower courts by which the cases
came to the supreme court).
137. 69 Ill. 2d at 401, 372 N.E.2d at 53.
138. Id. at 401, 372 N.E.2d at 52-53.
139. See, e.g., People ex rel. Munson v. Bartels, 138 Ill. 322. 328, 27
N.E. 1091, 1092 (1891); Lusietto v. Kingan, 107 Ill. App. 2d 239, 244,
246 N.E.2d 24, 27 (1969); Fustin v. Board of Educ., 101 Ill. App. 2d 113,
121, 242 N.E.2d 308, 312 (1968).
140. 65 Ill. 2d 485, 502-03, 359 N.E.2d 149, 158 (1976).
141.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, § 6 (1975) reads in pertinent part:

Whenever the attorney general or state's attorney is sick or absent, or unable to attend, or is interested in any cause or proceeding,
civil or criminal, which it is or may be his duty to prosecute or defend, the court in which said cause or proceeding is pending may
appoint some competent attorney to prosecute or defend such cause
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It is interesting to note that one of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention foresaw that this situation would arise.
She brought up the question of what would occur when the Attorney General was faced with the problem of representing competing state agencies or departments. 1 42 While Briceland was
faced with this dilemma, it refused to provide long-range guidelines. Guidelines have since been established in Environmental
Protection Agency v. Pollution Control Board.48 Here the Illinois Pollution Control Board sought a determination that it was
entitled to representation by private counsel in any action in
which the EPA, as represented by the Attorney General, appealed from a Board order. The Board contended that the Attorney General represented the EPA before the Board and upon
appeal, and would be unable to represent both the EPA and the
Board upon appeal, as this would create a serious conflict of
interest. The supreme court held that, with two exceptions,
the Attorney General could represent competing state agencies,
the two exceptional situations being when he is interested as
a private individual and when he is an actual party to the litigation. 44 With these two exceptions, only, the Attorney General is able to represent competing state agencies in a dispute.
CONCLUSION

People ex rel. Scott v. Briceland145 stands at the vanguard
of a movement toward complete centralization of the State's legal
talent. The supreme court has found a case that misinterpreted
the common law powers of the Attorney General, 14 6 and has misconstrued this case to formulate a rule of law never contemplated
at common law. Illinois has previously held that litigants are
not entitled to jury trials in actions under the Environmental
Protection Act because these special statutory proceedings were
unknown at common law, 47 yet Briceland states that the Attoror proceeding, and the attorney so appointed shall have the same
power and authority in relation to such cause or proceeding as the
attorney general or state's attorney would have had if present and
attending to the same. . . . (emphasis added).
142. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 117, at 1313 (Delegate Leahy sought
a solution to what she considered the "schizophrenic role" of the attorney
general, the possibility of conflict inherent in the fact that he has the
power to bring suit in the name of the people of Illinois, and is also
charged with representing the officers of the state. The response of
Delegate Young was that the committee did not consider these problems
to be of such a nature that something should be done in the constitution).
143. 69 Ill. 2d 394, 372 N.E.2d 50 (1977). See text accompanying notes
135-39 supra.
144. 69 fl. 2d at 400-01, 372 N.E.2d at 52. See McGreevey, supra note
135, at 311-14.
145. 65 ll. 2d 485, 359 N.E.2d 149 (1976).
146. Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915).
147. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
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ney General has the power to prosecute actions under the
Environmental Protection Act because of his common law
povers.148 By means of such inconsistencies, it has been irrefutably established that henceforth no legal action will be taken
by or for the State except with the approval of and by the solitary direction of the Attorney General. Because of its constitutional stature, this "impregnable bastion" is now open to modification only by a constitutional amendment, as the court refuses
to recognize the "constitutional statute" exception. 14 9
In its interpretation of the Environmental Protection Act, 150
the supreme court correctly determined that the General Assembly directed the EPA to prosecute all administrative actions,
but failed to comprehend the legislature's reason for doing so.
Administrative agencies, by their very nature, need to have
one directing head if they are to function at their optimum ability. This decision "substitute[s] the Attorney General as the directing head of all such boards and commissions, instead of the
15
chief executive, who is by law entrusted with such matters," '
and raises questions as to the ability of the EPA to function effectively under two masters.
Those cases decided subsequent to Briceland highlight the
trend in Illinois to create a unified -and centralized Attorney
General with awesome power to control litigation in Illinois.
Fuchs'52 establishes that the Attorney General is the only person
who is able to bring suit against state legislators who have received illegal bribes.158 Environmental Protection Agency v.
Pollution Control Board'54 establishes that the Attorney General
will be able to represent both sides in a dispute between agencies. 15 5 This endowment of power carries the implication that
the Attorney General will be able to influence court decisions,
as he will direct the appeals and legal documents of both sides
of the dispute. Finally, the tone of the supreme court indicates
that even more power may be given to the Attorney General.
The supreme court has stated:
The Attorney General's responsibility is not limited to serving or representing the particular interests of State agencies,
including opposing State agencies, but embraces serving or rep148. 65 Ill. 2d 485, 501, 359 N.E.2d 149, 157 (1976).

149. See notes 33-50 and accompanying text supra.
150. ILL. Rv.STAT. ch. 1111,2, §§ 1001-1051 (1975).

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
312-19

270 Ill. 304, 358, 110 N.E. 130, 150 (1915) (Craig, J., dissenting).
65 Ill. 2d 503, 359 N.E.2d 158 (1976).
Id. at 510, 359 N.E.2d at 162.
69 Ill. 2d 394, 372 N.E.2d 50 (1977).
Id. at 401, 372 N.E.2d at 53. See McGreevey, supra note 135, at
(discusses the effects, both practical and theoretical, of this deci-

sion and attempts to reconcile the case with other Illinois law).
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resenting the broader interests of the State. . . . It seems to
us that if the Attorney General is to have the unqualified role
of the chief legal officer of the State, he or she must be able
to direct the legal affairs of the State and its agencies. Only in
this way will the Attorney General properly serve the State and
the public interest. 156
In support of a centralized legal advisory system, the Illinois
Supreme Court has reasoned that private counsel for state agencies is expensive, and centralization is more efficient. 15 7 What
the supreme court fails to realize is that entrusting too much
power to one official presents greater opportunity for abuses, as
fewer people are able to supervise and restrain the activities of
this official. This finding was supported by the actions of the
drafters of the United States Constitution, who well understood
that an efficient and orderly government requires a system of
checks and balances, as well as the distribution of power among
many officials.
Thomas E. Grace

156. 69 Ill. 2d at 401-02, 372 N.F.2d at 53.
157. Id. at 399, 372 N.E.2d at 52.

